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Transocean oil safety a reoccuring issue
Orange-colored chemical dispersant flows through the water off the coast of Louisiana to help the massive oil spill.
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Orange-colored chemical dispersant flows through the water off the coast of Louisiana to help the massive oil spill.
An oil-soaked absorption pad and containment boom used to collect spilled oil is towed behind a shrimp boat off the coast of Louisiana.
TEXT OF INTERVIEW
Stacey Vanek-Smith: A ship carrying a 100-ton concrete and steel dome arrived at the oil leak site in the Gulf of Mexico. BP plans to drop the dome over the leak site, which is spitting more than 200,000 gallons of oil into the Gulf every day. It turns out Transocean, the company that built the faulty rig has had safety problems before in Britain. Our own Stephen Beard joins us live now from London. Good morning, Stephen.
Stephen Beard: Hello, Stacey.
Vanek-Smith: So what exactly is Transocean accused of doing wrong?
Beard: There were two violations in the North Sea that are perhaps significant in the light of the Gulf of Mexico disaster. They involve the safety device, which apparently failed in the Gulf of Mexico rig, the blowout preventer. This is the huge valve that is supposed to seal the head of the oil well to prevent oil and gas gushing out.
Vanek-Smith: So what happened in the British cases, was there an accident?
Beard: No, but British health and safety inspectors found fault with the blowout preventer on two Transocean rigs. They said the equipment was not in good working order or in good repair. The company was ordered to put things right, which it did. It's clear that safety equipment is going to be the key issue in this story. Along with the blowout preventer, there's also the separate question of the so-called acoustic switch, a safety device that was not fitted to the Deepwater Horizon rig. It's not required in the U.S. -- indeed only two countries in the world require it. David Doig, an oil safety expert, speaking at a big oil conference in Houston, wondered why it's not mandatory everywhere:
David Doig: The question needs to be asked is why only two countries when we have a global industry where all the players are working across all the boundaries? You don't work in the local environment, you work globally as a global oil company.
Vanek-Smith: Well, we'll keep following this. Stephen Beard in London. Thank you, Stephen.
Beard: OK, Stacey.
There is all this attention being paid to the Blowout Preventor when the more important question is... "How did a gas bubble get in the borehole column in the first place?"
This doesn't excuse the problems with the blowout preventor, but, if the gas bubble had not formed then there would be no issue with the blowout preventor.
How could this have happened if they had just (20 hours earlier) cased and cemented the borehole?
When you case and cement a borehole you effectively temporarily "Seal it back up"... that is .... make it unusable... no gas or oil or anything for that matter in or out... it is stopped up...
BP is telling the story like it is a surprise that "cement gets hot when it cures"... that it is a surprise that Methane Crystals where present.... that the Methane melted when it got heated by the curing cement.....
Isn't this all pretty standard stuff when drilling at this depth...
You want methane to be present to help lift the oil up out of the hole... the methane is going to be on the top of the formation... you drill through the crystalized methane to get down to the oil producing zone.... you have to case and cement the borehole once you are finished drilling... you case it with steel and cement... and the cement is going to warm up a little when it cures.... which is likely to cause some of the methane crystals to turn to gas....
Daaaaaaaaaaa....
Here are some interesting questions...
- How was the hole cased..? What the casing and cement continued from the bottom of the hole all the way up to the well head.. or did BP have Hal simply shim the casing in the bottom of the hole to the bottom of the previously cased portion of the whole... If one brings easing and cement layer all the way to the top then the result is a better seal and a stronger well... but it costs more... and takes longer...
- why did Transocean remove the drilling mud from the drilling column before they were finished working on the well... Drilling Mud helps to hold pressurized material in the hole... so if the cement had not finished curing why remove the Mud Weight.....
- Why wasn't the gas flared off at the mud return.... or did something else happen...
Just some things to think about...
So if you have a driller with a spotting safety record working for an oil well producer with a spotty safety records do two wrongs make a right??
Course you don't say what was wrong with the blowout preventers in the North Sea.... these could have been minor issues discovered in routine inspections... and given the importance of the Blowout preventor it is hard to image Transocean operating the rig knowing that the blowout preventor was suspect...
Its more likely that the whatever happen was so violent that it disabbled the blowout preventor in some way..
- What is the safety effect of having lots of BP Execs on the rig for a victory party....??
Space on a rig, even the big ones, is at a premium... the pressure of having senior executives on the rig could have resulted in the drilling crew being less attentive to their job then when just the regular folks are about.. The emphasis could have been on looking good for the Execs rather than on the hazzards of the work at hand...
just some thoughts...
